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FRED L. LIEB
duced by acts not those of the offender. It also
provided a new defense for those whose intoxica-
tion is caused by physical and psychological factors,
in other words the chronic alcoholic.
Whether or not the legislature had the above
considerations in mind, they did provide the
alcoholic with a new defense. Thus both insanity
and alcoholism may absolve an individual of
criminal responsibility. In both cases the same
factors must be proven. A similar situation exists
for the narcotic addict in the District of Columbia,
although here it has been judicially created. As
noted above, narcotic addiction has been allowed
as evidence of mental illness under the Durham
rule due to the recognition of the close relationship
between these two factors. 7' Thus alcoholism and
addiction may be merely two of the total number
of diseases which can be considered when dis-
cerning one's criminal responsibility.
The situation, however, is made more complex
by the Driver decision. Prior to Driver, an alcoholic
or addict would have to plead and prove the
elements of mental impairment. Even under the
Illinois statute where there is a specific provision for
these individuals, the same elements must be
shown as if the defense were insanity. Depending
upon the state in which the offense is committed
an individual might have to satisfy the M'Naugh-
ten test, the Durham test, ALI test, or any varia-
tion thereof. However, Robinson and Driver have
shown that for certain offenses the Eighth Amend-
ment requires a universal test. These cases are
limited to narcotic addiction and public drunken-
ness, but they indicate that perhaps addicts and
alcoholics require separate consideration. On the
other hand, if the hypothesis discussed in this
comment is correct, the Eighth Amendment re-
71 See Horton v. United States, 317 F.2d'595 (D.C.
Cir. 1963); Brown v. United Stated, 331 F.2d 822 (D.C.
Cir. 1965).
quires a universal rule to be applied in all cases of
criminal responsibility and not just for a separate
class of individuals or offenses.
Coxlusion. On its face the Driver rule appears
to be so similar to the Durham rule that it does
not seem unreasonable to contend that the latter
is constitutionally required. When the two de-
cisions are seen in context, however, differences
begin to appear. The Durham rule requires a
"but for" relationship while it is unclear what
constitutes a symptom in the Driver sense. In fact,
as seen above, the court in Driver may not really
have meant what it said, or at least chose the
wrong words to say it. Yet the court's concern
about punishing a man in Driver's position is
similar to that which has motivated the courts of
this country to liberalize the standards of criminal
responsibility. The judges on the Driver and Easter
courts may not have been thinking of the Durham
rule, but by attempting to formulate a new rule
of criminal responsibility for alcoholics, in light
of advanced medical knowledge, they unwittingly
approximated another rule which had been formu-
lated with a similar concern for modernization.
Thus it is not so easy to dismiss the similarity of
the two rules merely by pointing out the semantic
differences.
The problem cannot be resolved, however, until
the courts consider more cases in the area of
alcoholism and narcotic addiction and determine
exactly what they mean by the terms they use and
what actions their decisions encompass. As in the
area of mental illness, the courts must consider
scientific studies in greater depth and take a more
realistic look at the problems of the addict. It is
only then that we can determine whether the
Durham rule, or any rule governing criminal
responsibility, is constitutionally required by the
Eighth Amendment.
THE AFTERMATH OF SHEPPARD: SOME PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE
FREE PRESS-FAIR TRIAL CONTROVERSY
RUSH T. HAINES II
The decision of the Supreme Court in Sheppard the fire of the free press-fair trial controversy.
v. Maxwell, if nothing more, added potent fuel to Both sides in this argument seize upon the fact that
I Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 86 S. Ct. 1507 the indictment and eventual conviction of Dr. Sam
(1966). In that case the Cleveland newspapers had, for Sheppard for the slaying of his wife. In reversing the
all practical purposes, conducted a campaign to obtain conviction on the grounds that Sheppard had been
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the Court expressly refused to discuss whether
courts have the power to restrict the news media
in its dissemination of prejudicial material. 2 The
free press exponents argue that such refusal was
simply a reaffirmation of the seeming blanket im-
munity granted the press in the Bridges,' Penne-
kampl and Craig' cases. Those who favor regula-
tion of the press, on the other hand, see this refusal
as a tacit invitation to restrict the press where the
publication of prejudicial material is likely to af-
fect the decision of the jury. To bolster their re-
spective views, the advocates of both positions
freely extract quotations from Sheppard, often out
of context, so that each claims support from the
same case.6
denied a fair trial, the Supreme Court criticized the
trial judge: for not having granted a change of venue
and a continuance; for failing to control commentary
on the case by the attorneys, court officials, and police
involved in the proceedings; for failing to maintain
order and decorum in the court, and for failing to advise
the news media of the impropriety of certain type of
reporting.
2 Id. at 358. "We conclude that these procedures
would have been sufficient to guarantee Sheppard a
fair trial and so do not consider what sanctions might
be available against a recalcitrant press."
3Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941). The
contempt convictions of a newspaper, its editor, and a
labor leader were reversed with the majority holding
that the utterances directed at a trial judge sitting
without a jury, did not meet the necessary clear and
present danger for the infliction of punishment for
contempt.
4 Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946). The
Court found that editorials and cartoons which criti-
cized local judges for the actions in non-jury criminal
cases did not constitute a clear and present danger to
the administration of justice.
' Craig v. Hamey, 331 U.S. 367 (1947). Articles
violently criticizing a judge for his decision were held
not to be contemptuous. The court said that judges
"are supposed to be men of fortitude, able to thrive in
a hardy climate." supra at 376.
6 A case in point was the suit recently brought in
the Supreme Court of Illinois seeking a writ of man-
damus ordering the trial judge in the case of People v.
Speck, Indictment Nos. 67 y 20-67 y 27 (10th Jud.
Cir. of Ill. 1967), to abandon some of the rules he had
adopted to prevent the dissemination of prejudicial
news. People ex rel. The Tribune Co. v. The Hon.
Herbert C. Paschen, No. 40507 (Sup. Ct. Ill., filed
Feb. 21, 1967). Petitioner in its brief at 10, cites the
proposition enunciated in Sheppard that, "a responsible
press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of
effective judicial administration, especially in the
criminal field. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 350." A
careful reading of the opinion in that case reveals,
however, that immediately following this salute to the
press, the Court qualifies its statements with a series of
'buts': "But ... legal trials are not like elections, to
be won through the use of the meeting-hall, the radio,
and the newspaper... ; but it must not be allowed to
divert the trial from the very purpose of a court sys-
tem." Sheppard supra at 350. At approximately the
same time that the Tribune Company was using the
That the Supreme Court found the prejudicial
publicity surrounding the trial of Dr. Sheppard to
be of such magnitude that reversal was in order, is
no real surprise in light of the reversals in previous
cases such as Irwin v. Dowd,' Rideau v. Louisiana,'
Marshall v. United State 9 and Estes v. Texas.0
Prior to these cases, appellate courts had usually
demanded a showing of actual prejudice to the de-
fendant. The voir dire examination and cautionary
instructions were heavily relied on to guard against
prejudice, and the trial judge was allowed broad
discretion in granting or denying a motion for a
continuance or change of venue."
The trend of the above cases, however, has been
such- that courts no longer need find actual preju-
dice in order to reverse-inherent prejudice is
sufficient. In Rideau the court did not even look to
the voir dire to determine if there was evidence of
prejudice, while in Estes and Turner v. StateP the
court cited the "probability" and the "potentiali-
ties" of prejudice. The discretion of the trial judge
was no longer sacrosanct as it became the "duty of
the Courts of Appeals to independently evaluate
the voir dire test of the empaneled jurors." "1 As if
it were not enough to assume that the jury read the
Sheppard case to support its arguments for freedom of
the press, Judge Douglas S. Lambeth was, in Florida,
restricting the news media from printing or broad-
casting, "any testimony presented and or evidence
exhibited unless same shall have been in the presence
of the jury." Florida v. Carlton, No. 98731 (Crim. Ct.
of Orange County, Nov. 10, 1966), aff'd, No. C.L.
66-5014 (Cir. Ct. of 9th Jud. Dist., Dec. 23, 1966). As
authority for so holding, judge Lambeth cited the
statement in Sheppard that, "The Court's fundamental
error is compounded by the holding that it lacked power
to control the publicity about the trial." Florida v.
Carlton, supra at 10. Taken in context, however, this
statement served primarily to introduce the Court's
suggested restrictions on leaking of news by court
officials, police officers, witnesses, and attorneys. With-
out here attacking the validity of these respective
positions, suffice to say that unless there is further
clarification by the Supreme Court, both positions will
continue to be tenuously supported by Sheppard.
7366 U.S. 717 (1961) (interviewing the public on
television before trial as to guilt or innocence of accused
and possible punishment).
8373 U.S. 723 (1963) (film,of defendant confessing
to sheriff shown on television).
9360 U.S. 310 (1959) (news accounts contained
evidence not admitted at trial).
10 381 U.S. 532 (1965) (national broadcast of trial).
" For an excellent historical development of these
pre-Sheppard cases see, Jaffe, Trial by Newspaper,
40 N.Y.U. L. REv. 504-516 (1965). See also Thompson,
The Law relating to ireuidicial News Reporting in
Criminal Cases, Free Press-Fair Trial, A Report of the
Proceedings of a Conference on Prejudicial News
Reporting in Criminal Cases, 7 (Inbau ed. 1964).
" 379 U.S. 466 (1965).
13 Irwin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 725 (1961).
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prejudicial material, the Court went even further
by cutting into the time-honored view that a juror
who could put aside his prejudice was acceptable,
by ruling that such a statement by a prospective
juror was not dispositive of the issue.14 Thus, to the
extent that the decision turned on the failure of the
trial judge to insure a fair trial by use of procedural
remedies such as change of venue, continuance, se-
questration and polling the jury, Sheppard did
nothing more than fit nicely into the liberal trend
of the above cases.
The decision, however, went further than citing
these available remedial measures. The Court for
the first time made a genuine effort to suggest
means by which the prejudicial material could be
suppressed before resulting in the harm which ne-
cessitates remedial measures. 15 It is these suggested
means for preventing the dissemination of the
prejudicial material in the first instance that make
Sheppard v. Maxwell a landmark decision. And it
is the purpose of the remainder of this Comment to
examine the effect of these suggestions on proposed
solutions to the free press-fair trial controversy.
CoNDucT or ATTORNEYS
It is almost universally agreed that there is a
distinct need for the bar to "put its own house in
order" in the area of prejudicial news dissemina-
tion 6 Heeding the admonition of the Court in
Sheppard that, "Collaboration between counsel and
the press as to information affecting the fairness
of a criminal trial is not only subject to regula-
tion, but is highly censurable and worthy of dis-
ciplinary measures," '7 lawyers and bar associa-
tions have been quick to recognize their duty.
Among the forerunners in the effort to insure an
"orderly house" are the Reardon Committee of the
American Bar Association on Free Press and Fair
Trial and the Medina Committee of the Bar of New
York. In an introductory passage, to the report of
the latter group Judge Medina states the problem:
The true facts as set forth in our Interim Report,
however, are that there is a wild scramble to get
favorable publicity, and those leading the pro-
cession, more often than not, are the lawyers...
14Mlarshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 313
(1959).
11 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966).
16 Such regulation has been approved by not only
the fair trial advocates, but also the press. See 55 I..
BAR J. 556 (1967). See also A Report of the Proceedings
of a Conference on Prejudicial News Reporting in
Criminal Cases, supra note 11.
17 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966).
for both sides.... [T]his is true despite the fact
that the number of lawyers who act in this man-
ner is extremely small.u
The solution to the problem does not seem to
pose any great difficulty. Both the Medina Report
and the Reardon Report" recommend a strength-
ening of Canon 20 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics. The present version of Canon 20 in effect in
most jurisdictions not only is not enforced, but is so
replete with loopholes that enforcement is prac-
tically impossible. Even Revised Canon 20 of the
New York Bar Association contains an escape
clause in that an attorney can in good faith "di-
vulge information for publication in reply to any
public statement which adversely affects the
interest of his client." 20 In order to shore up the
hole in this revised Canon 20, the Medina Com-
mittee proposed a new Canon 2021 which clearly
delineates certain conduct which is to be regarded
as "unprofessional." 2 In doing so the Committee
substantially subscribed to the view of former Dean
Erwin N. Griswold of the Harvard Law School
that:
The Canons should be amended to include an
absolute prohibition on the release by any law-
yer, either for the prosecution or the defense, of
any material relating to the trial, either before
the trial or while the trial is going on. This
should specifically preclude appearances of any
sort on radio of television relating to the forth-
coming or pending trial. It should also specifi-
cally forbid the relea-e of any statements to the
effect that the defendant has or has not con-
fessed, or that he has or does not have an alibi,
or otherwise. It should also specifically preclude
the release of evidence which would be inad-
missible in court, or the release of evidence which
has been offered in court and excluded by the
trial judge."
"8 SPECIAL ComMTTEE ON RADIO, T.V. AND AD-
MINISTRATION OF JUsTIcE OF T BAR AssociATioN
OF TnE CITY or Nzw YoRx, FRExnos oF HE PREss
AND FAIR TRIAL, 15 (1966) (hereinafter cited as MEDINA
REPORT).
9ABA PROJECT ON MINMIMUM STANDARDS FOR
CaRnaNA JUsTIcE, FAR TRIAL AND FREE PRESs §1.1
(Tent. Draft 1966) (hereinafter cited as REARDON
REPORT). This report, as revised July 1967, was ac-
cepted by the ABA House of Delegates on February
19, 1968.
"0 Canon 20 of the N.Y.S. Bar Assn. as revised Jan.
25, 1957, cited in MEDINA REPORT supra note 18, at 16.
SMEDNA REPORT, supra note 18, at 25-26.
"Because the Canon 20 recommended by the Medina
Committee is so clear, concise and inclusive, it is re-
printed in Appendix.
"1 Speech before ABA convention in New York City,
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The A.B.A. Report is substantially in agreement
with the Medina Report on this proposition. The
only substantial differences are that the A.B.A.
tentative draft allows extra-judicial statements by
attorneys as to: (a) evidence seized at the time of
arrest, and (b) testimony during legislative investi-
gations. With regard to the first exception, the
Reardon Committee thought that it would be in
the public interest-i.e. within the realm of ma-
terial that was the "public's right to know"-to
release, for example, the fact that a valuable stolen
object had been recovered.u The second difference
seems to be more one of form than content and thus
does not detract from the Medina proposal. It
seems, however, that for the sake of clarity an ex-
plication of this exception might be added to the
Medina Report.
The Reardon Report and the Medina Report also
differ on the problem of enforcement. The Medina
Committee, in keeping with its hope that the free
press-fair trial controversy will be resolved by
internal self-regulation of the various groups, rec-
ommends that enforcement not be implemented
through the vehicle of the contempt power.25 The
Reardon Committee, on the other hand, feels that
the most effective means of enforcement is an ex-
ternal force-here the court. Thus it calls for not
only censure, suspension, and disbarment, but, in
extreme cases, use of the contempt power.
26
Aug. 11, 1964, "The Right of Fair Trial: Responsibility
of the Public, The Legal Profession and the News
Media," cited in MEnhIA REPORT supra note 18, at 24.24 REAnon REPORT 90.
2
5 In keeping with this idea, various prosecutors
have introduced intra-departmental rules that prevent
the dissemination of leads, confessions or statements
of accused, potential evidence and results of tests.
TEE MEDINA REPORT, at p. 17, cites with approval
the practice of District Attorney Hogan in New York
City in this respect. Also the Office of the State's
Attorney in Chicago has a rule (initiated by Reardon
Committee member Daniel P. Ward, now serving on
the State Supreme Court), which prohibits any member
of that office from giving out confessions or the existence
of a statement, prior record, and results of scientific
tests. Louis L. Jaffe points out that the currently
favored solution in New jersey and Philadelphia is to
"shut the mouths of the.., prosecutor and defendant's
attorney. A violation of these rules would constitute a
breach of the Canons of Professional Ethics." Jaffe,
Trial by Newspaper, 40 N.Y.U. L. REv. 504, 519 (1965).26In line with these views, judges Raymond B.
Mallard and E. Maurice Braswell of the Superior Court
of the 13th Jud. Dist. of North Carolina, issued, on the
12th of September, 1966, a rule of court prohibiting
lawyers in any case before that court from making any
statement "for the purpose of publication or having
reason to believe that it will be published, concern-
ing... confession .... prior criminal record,.., results
of tests .... or what the evidence is expected to be."
judge Paschen in People v. Speck has also proscribed
REGULATION OF DISSEMINATION BY POLICE
AN COURT EmPLOYEES
The Court in Sheppard condemned the trial court
judge for not having "made some effort to control
the release of leaks, information and gossip to the
press by the police. ... " 2 It further stated that,
"Neither prosecutors, counsel for the defense, the
accused, witnesses, court staff nor enforcement
officers coming under the jurisdiction of the court
should be permitted to frustrate its function." 2
With respect to judicial employees the duty of
the court seems dear-it should issue a rule of court
prohibiting extra-judicial statements by any officer
of the court. The availability of contempt remedies
in the event of a violation of such rules by a judicial
officer seems to be equally dear and uncluttered by
constitutional objections. This is the method sug-
gested by the Reardon Report29 and followed in
recent cases.3"
The duty of the court and the available remedies
are not so clear in the area of supervision of the
police. The Medina Report sees any attempt at
imposing judicial control on the police as a po-
tentially unconstitutional invasion of the executive
branch by the judiciary., While that group is will-
ing to acknowledge judicial power over participat-
ing enforcement officers once the trial is under way,
they find no authority "inherent in the courts or
judges to discipline them for an alleged breach of
their duties as police officers." 2
The argument that the courts have no authority
over the police prior to the actual trial gathers sup-
port from State v. Van DuyneP3 and State v. Thwonp-
any extra-judicial comment by attorneys in the case.
Order No. IV (Cir. Ct. of the 10th Jud. Dist., Feb. 14,
1967).
Legislative proposals along these lines have been
made in Massachusetts, Mass. H.B. 3991 (1965), and
in the United States Senate. S. 290, 89th Cong. 1st
Sess. (1965). The latter proposal provides that:
It shall constitute contempt of court for any employee
of the United States, or for any defendant or his
attorney.., to furnish or make available for publica-
tion information not already properly filed with
the court which might affect the outcome of pending
criminal litigation except evidence that has already
been admitted at the trial.
1 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 359 (1966).
2 Id. at 363.
29 RE RoN REPORT, §2.3.
'0 People v. Speck, Order No. VI (Cir. Ct. of the
10th jud. Dist., Feb. 14, 1967). Florida v. Mitchell,
No. 66-9439 (Crim. Ct. of Broward County, Nov. 5,
1966). Florida v. Carlton, No. 98731 (Crim. Ct. of
Orange County, Sept. 7, 1966).
31 MEDINA REPORT, 40.3 2 Id.
3 State v. Van Duyne, 43 N.J. 369, 204 A.2d 841
(1964).
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son.3 In both of these cases the respective courts
denied that they had disciplinary power over the
police and suggested instead that the problem
should be dealt with by police administrators them-
selves. More confusion arises in the area of pre-trial
judicial control over police from the Sheppard
decision itself:
Being advised of the great interest in the case,
the mass coverage of the press, and the potential
impact of publicity, the court could also have
requested the appropriate city and county offi-
cials to promulgate a regulation with respect to
dissemination of information about the case by
their employees.35
Both the Van Duyne and Thompson courts as well
as the Medina Committee interpreted this passage
as implying a lack of judicial power over the police
prior to the time of trial. Thus they called instead
for internal self-regulation to cure the problem of
police dissemination of prejudicial news.
The Reardon Committee, however, did not find
the constitutional objections to be an insurmounta-
ble obstacle to their effort to formulate judicial
regulation of the police dissemination of news:
The concept of separation of powers is not one
that necessitates rigid and simplistic categoriza-
tion of every aspect of government; rather it is
one that reflects concern over the assumption by
one arm of government of the whole function of
another branch. Within the basic frame work of
checks and balances, it permits of areas of over-
lap and concurrent authority. The present prob-
lem, in the committee's view, falls into just such
an area. 6
Thus they proposed a rule of court which would,
"from the time of arrest, issuance of an arrest war-
rant, or the filing of any complaint, information, or
indictment in any criminal matter within the juris-
diction of this court, until the completion of trial or
disposition without trial," "I prohibit release of
certain matter such as confessions, prior record,
and performance or results of tests.
In arguing that this rule did not amount to an
unconstitutional invasion of the executive, the
Committee noted that courts have power to make
rules governing procedure in civil and criminal liti-
gation." Although conceding that such rules nor-
mally relate to the manner in which a case shall be
34 State v. Thompson, 139 N.W.2d 490 (Minn. 1966).
31 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333,362 (1966).
36 
REARDON REPORT, 102.
37 REARDoN REPORT, §2.1.
n Id. at 102.
tried, they pointed out that Rule 5 (a) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure directing the
arresting officer to take the arrestee before a com-
missioner without unnecessary delay,39 is a "judi-
cial command addressed to the conduct of law
enforcement officers and designed to require them
to take steps to provide that the person arrested be
properly arraigned." 40 As a second constitutional
basis for its proposal, the Reardon group argued
that arrest marked the beginning of a judicial pro-
ceeding and thus made it appropriate for courts to
control the conduct of those participating in that
proceeding.a In support of this jurisdictional argu-
ment, the Committee also noted that occasionally
the exercise of power over a police officer is based
on the view that such person, when detaining one
against whom criminal action is pending, is con-
sidered an officer of the court and thus subject to
the court's orders.4 Having decided that the
judiciary indeed has power to issue the above order
to the police, the Committee concluded that the re-
sulting use of the contempt power as a means of
enforcement was clearly within even the narrow
confines of the federal contempt statute permitting
punishment for contempt of one who is "in dis-
obedience or resistance to [the court's] lawful...
rule." 13
While this argument is no doubt appealing, the
logic is somewhat undermined by the fact that: (a)
the rules of procedure derive from a legislative
grant of powerM and not necessarily from a power
inherent in the judiciary; (b) enforcement of the
provisions controlling police conduct has been
through coercive exclusionary rules rather than
direct contempt proceedings; and (c) cases dealing
with the question of jurisdiction speak only in
terms of when it attaches to a particular de-
fendant 45 and do not explicitly support the proposi-
tion that it is at this point that participating wit-
nesses and police officers are brought within the
jurisdiction of the trial judge. That courts do in-
deed indirectly control the conduct of police is
evident from the reaction of that body after a deci-
sion such as Miranda.46 Charges are made that the
police power to combat crime is being undermined,
9 FED. R. Cpan. P. Sa.
4 0 
REARDON REPORT, 103.41 Id.
4Id. at 105.
18 U.S.C. §401 (1964). Cited in REARDON REPORT,
106.
44 18 U.S.C. §3771.
46 21 Am Jur 2d §376, 390.
46 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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but they nonetheless strive to stay within the man-
dates of the judicial rule to avoid further reversals.
Thus, while this constitutional argument will con-
tinue until the Supreme Court elucidates its posi-
tion in Sheppard and decides whether courts have
jurisdiction over police and witnesses from the
moment of arrest until the start of the trial, the
issue might possibly become moot by the self-im-
position of regulations aimed at staying within the
bourds of Sheppard to avoid reversals.0 The Rear-
don Committee, in recognition of the steps that are
being taken toward self-regulation, amended sec-
tions 2.1 and 2.2 of its Revised Tentative Draft to
propose that "the entire matter be dealt with at
the outset by department regulation and that with
respect to the period from arrest to the completion
of trial, a rule of court or legislative enactment be
resorted to only if a law enforcement agency fails
to adopt and adhere to the substance of the recom-
mended regulation 'within a reasonable time'." 3
Nevertheless, the original proposal has some fol-
lowers. At the present time a rule of court govern-
ing the release of information by the police from
the moment of arrest is in effect in Wake County,
North Carolina.
49
Of all the groups claiming infringement by re-
strictions on the dissemination of news, the one
with a most pressing claim is the law enforcement
agency. Due to the combination of a morbid in-
terest in crimes of violence and fear that a vicious
criminal may be at large, there is a demand by the
public for a showing by the police of capability in
solving a crime. Perhaps unwilling to acknowledge
the existence of, and accept responsibility for, a
degenerate element in its midst, the public tends to
cast the blame for a successful crime on the police
failure to prevent it. Thus there is constant pressure
on the police to demonstrate that the case is near-
47 Such self-policing has already been undertaken by
the Office of the Attorney General of the United States.
Its directive to personnel of the Justice Department
advises against the release of observations about de-
fendant's character, statements of defendant, tests
given defendant, identity or credibility of prospective
witnesses, and evidence. 28 C.F.R. §50.2 (1965). Similar
regulations in New Jersey provide that release of in-
formation in violation of the rules would constitute
"conduct unbecoming an officer" and would warrant
"discipline at the hands of the proper authorities."
Jaffe, supra note 25, at 520. Typical of such regulations
is that under consideration by the Chicago Police
Department (included in the Appendix infra).
48ABA PRojEcT ON Mnrr STA r Dns FOR
CnusNA JusTIcE, FAm TRAL Ain Frxn PEss, 22-23
(Rev. Tent. Draft, 1967).
41 Order of the Superior Court of the 13th Judicial
District of North Carolina (Sept. 12, 1966).
ing solution and that the perpetrator will soon be
in custody. To avoid the accusation of suppressing
information to cover up malfeasance, there is a
legitimate tendency on the part of the police to co-
operate with the press and thus escape being cast
n an unfavorable light. The pressures on the police
were well explicated by former Los Angeles Police
Chief, W. H. Parker:
Another factor is the police necessity for justify-
ing a course of action or the lack of action. Un-
fortunately, there is a tendency in America to
substitute the police officer for the defendant in a
criminal trial, and thus there are all sorts of
accusations made about the things the police did
or did not do, and they have no arena in which
to defend themselves. Particularly when there is
a serious crime there is a clamor for action. What
are the police- doing? What progress have you
made? Why haven't you arrested this man?
J think that in a truly American fashion, the
police administrator is going to attempt to ac-
quaint the people who represent the public-that
is the news media-with a situation generally, so
that the people can be informed and the police
situation explained, because without public sup-
port, the whole police department should go
home and save the taxpayer money.0
The ideal solution-from the point of view of the
police--would be to allow them free rein in releas-
ing information to reassure the public.
When Richard Speck was arrested in connection
with the murder of eight nurses in Chicago, not
only was his criminal record published, but the
local police chief announced that he was "abso-
lutely positive" of the guilt of the accused." Such
a statement obviously served as a placebo to the
enraged and frightened public and further helped
to eliminate criticism of the police department. It
was not, however, consonant with the right of the
accused to a fair trial with the presumption of in-
nocence."2 Thus it is incumbent on the police to
60 Statement recorded in Conference on Prejudicial
News Reporting in Criminal Cases, 134 (Inhau ed.
1964).
51 MEDiNA REPORT, 60.
u Recently two young boys were bound and shot to
death in Rockford, Illinois in a manner that the news
media described as an execution. The police, in a
genuine effort to apprehend the killer, made many of
their leads available to the press in the hope that the
publicity would bring forth a woman who had called
to tip the police off as to the killings. Even under the
rules promulgated by the Reardon Committee, such
disclosure would have been proper until the fugitive
was caught. However, once an arrest was made in
connection with the case, the authorities failed to call
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adhere to standards consistent with those placed
on other agencies of the criminal justice system-
regardless of the source of these standards.-
CONDUCT OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
The remedies suggested in Sheppard as available
to the trial judge to insure a fair trial once prejudi-
cial news has permeated the community, were not
surprising in light of the pre-Sheppard cases com-
manding reversal where inherent prejudice was
found. The rationale for determining prejudice
since that decision has not changed greatly from
that in the Irwin v. Dowd series of cases. M Of
course, in reversing for failure to avoid prejudice
through change of venue or continuance, the ap-
pellate courts had another important case on which
to rely, but most of these cases would have come
out the same with or without Sheppard."5 In this
respect it is therefore important to note in passing
that the trial judges since Sheppard have shown a
keen awareness that their exercise of discretion in
ruling on a motion for a change of venue or con-
tinuance is carefully studied on appeal" Also the
voir dire examination is becoming more scrutiniz-
ing. 51 And finally the "cause" for which a juror
may be excused is less demanding."
a halt to the release of news. Thus, Chicago television
stations were able to broadcast live interviews with the
suspect's father in which a record of prior arrests for
sniping was brought out. One station went so far as to
interview a shop owner who sold a .22 caliber pistol to
accused (the pistol is still not found), and elicited the
statement that accused had said to his father, "I want
that gun!" Obviously most of the leads which enabled
the enterprising newsmen to ferret out the subjects
interviewed and the fact of the prior record, were
traceable to the local police. In spite of the fact that
such post-arrest leaking by the police is understandable,
it still is not in keeping with the right of the accused to
a fair trial. The suspect here involved has since been
found guilty of murder.
3In the recent investigation into the slaying of
Valerie Percy, daughter of Senator Percy, the police,
invoking Sheppard, firmly refused to release leads to
the news media. Even though that crime is as yet
unsolved, criticism of the police was slight, and publicity
quickly died down.
"Cases cited notes 7 and 8 supra.
5 For examples of the application of Sheppard,
Dowd, e at in these cases see: Rubenstein v. State,
407 S.W.2d 795 (Tex. Cr. App 1966) (reversed for failure
to change venue); People v. Meyers, 35 Ill.2d 328
(1966) (change of venue denied-Sheppard distin-
guished); Baldwin v. Kentucky, 406 S.W.2d 862 (1966)
(hearing on requested change of venue allowed).
51Thus in the recent trials of Richard Speck in
Illinois, and Carl Coppolino in Florida, changes of
venue were granted. Chicago Sun-Times, April 4, 1967,
at 6.
5 In the Speck case, 610 prospective jurors were
examined before the entire panel was filled. Chicago
Sun-Times, April 4, 1967, at 34.
The Reardon Committee, in an effort to exercise
the maximum power of the court to insure a fair
trial, recommended not only liberal use of venue
change and continuance, but also individual ex-
amination of the prospective jurors out of the pres-
ence of the other talesmen. In this way it is hoped
that the true feelings and prejudices of the juror
will be elicited." Desiring to avoid, as much as
possible, a head-on collision with the press, that
committee also recommended that pretrial pro-
ceedings not in the hearing of the jury be conddcted
in camera when the publication of the subject mat-
ter of such hearings would involve a risk of preju-
dice to the defendant."0 Thus, if during these
pretrial hearings certain evidence was found to be
inadmissible, potential jurors would not read about
it in the morning papers. The press has called this
proposal an unconstitutional invasion of the right
of public trial." But it might be asked to whom
the right to a public trial belongs-the defendant
or the press. In United Press Association v. Va-
lente,62 the New York Court of Appeals held
that the right to a public trial was the defendant's,
and that members of the public at large, including
the press, had no enforceable right of their own to
insist that a criminal trial be open to the public."
In spite of the fact that there is some authority to
the contrary," the Reardon Committee felt that
the need to avoid prejudice to the defendant out-
weighed the policy in favor of open proceedings. 65
"8 One prospective juror in the Speck case was ex-
cused for cause when it was revealed on voir dire that
he remembered vaguely that Speck was an "ex-con."
No inquiry was made as to whether this prospective
juror could dismiss from his mind this fact and decide
the case solely on the evidence. Ti=r, April 7, 1967,
at 63.
9 REARDON REPORT, §3.4.
60 Id. at §3.1 and §3.5. In Speck most of the pretrial
hearings were held in camera.
1TME, March 10, 1967, at 94.
2United Press Association v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71,
123 N.E.2d 777 (1954).
6Id. at 73-79, 778-783. cf. Geise v. United States,
265 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1959).
'Some cases have held that defendant cannot
prevent public attendence by waiving his right to a
public trial. 21 Am. JuR. 2d 259.
65 EARDON REPORT, 143. The proposal provides
that a record be kept of all closed proceedings, and,
that at the close of the trial, they be made public.
The United Nations through its Human Rights
Commission of ECOSOC has proposed the following
article for its Draft Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights:
All persons shall be equal before the courts and
tribunals. In the determination of any criminal
charge against him, or of his rights and obligations
in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair
and public hearing by a competent, independent and
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In answer to the suggestions in Sheppard that
the trial judge control the dissemination of news by
witnesses, parties, lawyers and police officers com-
ing under the jurisdiction of the court, the Reardon
Report prohibits extra-judicial statements by law-
yers, court officials and police.6" It does not how-
ever extend such treatment to witnesses. In spite
of the statement in Sheppard that, "the trial court
might well have proscribed extra-judicial state-
ments by any... witness ... which divulged prej-
udicial matters... ,7 the Committee felt that it
was not appropriate to propose a rule proscribing
extra-judicial statements by a person not partici-
pating in the case as counsel or serving in the
status of a law enforcement officer.As Instead it
recommended that the trial judge: "(1) caution the
witnesses and the defendant himself against making
extra-judicial statements; (2) preclude witnesses
from disclosing testimony given at a dosed hear-
ing; and (3) isolate witnesses prior to their appear-
ance on the stand if necessary to prevent exposure
to the summaries or narratives of others." 69
The Medina Report is in substantial agreement
with the Reardon Committee except for the sug-
gestions regarding dosed hearings. In this respect
the Medina group cites Craig v. Harney7 6 for the
proposition that what happens in the court room
is public property, and further that the trial judge
has no power to prohibit the publication of such
proceedings by the news media 1 With respect to
the power over the parties, witnesses and police
officers, however, the Medina Committee is willing
to go as far as the Reardon proposal, if not further.
They authorize instructions to the jury not to read
any material concerning the case and orders to the
parties, police and witnesses in the case not to make
impartial tribunal established by law. The press and
the public may be excluded from all or part of a trial
for reasons of morals, public order (ordre public) or
national security in a democratic society, or when
the interest of the private lives of the parties so
requires, or to the extent strictly necessary in the
opinion of the court in special circumstances where
publicity would prejudice the interests of justice;
but any judgment rendered in a criminal case or in
a suit at law shall be made public except where the
interest of juveniles otherwise requires or the pro-
ceedings concern matrimonial disputes or the guard-
ianship of children. (Draft Covenant on Civil and
Political rights, Art. 14, par. 1, cited in BIsHOp, IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW, CAsES AND MATEPIAmS, 277 (2d
ed. 1962)).66IREARDoN REPORT, §1.1-1.3, §2.1-2.3.
1 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 361 (1966).
63 REARDONI REPORT, 142.
69 Id.
70 Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947).
71
M EDINA REPORT, 46.
any extra-judicial statements. A violation of either
the instructions or the orders would result in a
finding of contempt. As a final palliative, both com-
mittees endorse a policy of jury sequestration
where there is a chance of prejudice. Even this,
however, has its defects.
72
CONTROL OF THE NEws MEDIA
Why, one might ask, is it necessary to go to all
of these extraordinary lengths when the. problem
would be eliminated if restraints were imposed on
the news media by court orders and the contempt
power? The answer lies in the fact that, in spite of
justice Frankfurter's warning that, "The Court
has not yet decided that, while convictions must be
reversed and miscarriages of justice result because
the minds of jurors or potential jurors were poi-
soned, the poisoner is constitutionally protected in
plying his trade," 73 it is generally assumed that
three opinions of the Supreme Court,74 handed
down during the 1940's, shield the press from such
an application of the contempt power. These cases,
while acknowledging the fact that freedom of the
press and free speech are not absolute guarantees,
extrapolated from the sedition cases the "dear and
present danger" test to describe the limits of these
freedoms. Thus it was necessary that the sub-
stantive evil-the disruption of justice-be ex-
tremely serious and the degree of imminence ex-
tremely high before utterances could be punished.75
There are three aspects of these cases which
render their application to cases like Sheppard ex-
tremely suspect. First, none of those cases involved
a jury trial; the Court expressly qualified its deci-
sions to non-jury proceedingsY6 Secondly, the al-
legedly contemptuous material in those cases was
72james R. Thompson pointed out in his paper on
Preiudicial News Reporting in Criminal Cases, supra
note 11, that, while sequestration is good in theory,
"defendants are ordinarily reluctant to request that the
jury be kept together during the entire trial. There is a
fear that jurors who are thus inconvenienced may bear
a resentment towards the defendant or may compromise
their verdict in order to end the trial quickly. Then
too, newspapers sometimes find their way into the
jury room even though the jury has been locked up."
73Irwin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) (concurring
opinion).
74 Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941); Penne-
kamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946); Craig v. Harney,
331 U.S. 367 (1947).75 Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941).76 See Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962), where
the Court said, at 389-390, "Moreover, we need not
pause here to consider the variant factors that would
be present in a case involving a petit jury. Neither
Bridges, Pennekamp, nor Harney involved a trial by
jury."
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a criticism of the decision, and not, as in a jury
case, a violation of a preexisting rule of court. And
thirdly, the contempt proceedings in those cases
were basically summary in nature.
If the suggestion of the Reardon Committee is
followed, a rule of court would first issue proscrib-
ing the publication of material presented out of the
hearing of the jury. The specificity of this prior
notice should satisfy the objection in Bridges that
the vagueness and generality of the contempt
power requires a restricted usage. Secondly, the
proposal of the Reardon Committee would require
that a contempt case be tried to a jury and before
a different judge than the one who issued the
contempt citation. Since all of the rights and reme-
dies of a normal criminal trial would be available to
the defendant in such contempt proceedings, an
objection to the summary nature would have no
merit.
An alternative argument in favor of the exercise
of the contempt power over a "recalcitrant press"
is that, even if the clear and present danger test
applies in a jury trial, a clear and present danger
exists where material which would result in a mis-
trial or reversal-if admitted into evidence-is
presented to the jury or potential jury by the news
media. The Supreme Court has held that the
prejudice resulting from the dissemination of
inadmissible evidence "may indeed be greater than
when it is part of the prosecution's case for it is
then not tempered by protective procedures." 7
The logical conclusion of this argument is that a
clear and present danger exists wherever circum-
stances are such that reversal on the grounds of
prejudice to the defendant would result, as in
Rideau, Sheppard and IrwinYs
State courts that have considered the propriety
of judical restrictions on the dissemination of news
by the news media are about evenly divided in the
result they reach. In the case of Florida v. Mit-
chell,'9 the trial judge, while refusing to grant an
order prohibiting the dissemination of back-
ground information relating to any witness and
the names of the jury, did prohibit the publishing
of any "testimony heard by the court outside the
presence of the jury and which is excluded from
the evidence presented." 80 Two days later the
same judge issued an order in the case of Florida v.
7 Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 313
(1959).78 Thompson, Prejudicial News Reporting in Criminal
Cases, supra note 11 at 25.
79 No. 66-9439 (Crim. Ct. of Broward County, Nov.
8, 1966).80Id. at 10.
Carltow,1s substantially the same in its restriction
of the news media. This order was challenged in
the state appellate courts and upheld.82
A contrary result was reached in Arizona. There
in Phoenix Newspapers Inc. v. Superior Court of
Maricopa County,"' the state supreme court not
only reversed the contempt citation of a newspa-
s1 No. 98731 (Crim. Ct. of Orange County, Nov. 10,
1966).
82 Florida ex rel. Sentinel Star Co. v. Hon. D.S.
Lambeth, No. 1141 (Dist. Ct. of App. for the 4th Dist.
of Fla., Dec. 3, 1966) (dismissed for lack of jurisdiction).
No. C.L. 66-5014 (Cir. Ct. of the 9th Jud. Dist., Dec.
23, 1966) (petition for mandamus dismissed).
In the Speck case, supra note 6, trial Judge Herbert
C. Paschen issued orders which, among other things,
prohibited the sale or release of transcripts until the
conclusion of trial, and further prohibited sketches or
drawings to be made in the court house. Finally, the
order prohibited the release or publication of the names
of prospective, selected or released jurors until the
completion of trial, and placed the news media on notice
as to the "impropriety of publishing material not
introduced in the proceedings." It also contained a
prohibition on the publication of anything occuring
out of the hearing of the jury. Order Nos. VIE, X, III,
IX (Cir. Ct. of the 10th Jud. of Ill., Feb. 14, 1967).
These restrictions were challenged in a mandamus
proceeding in the Supreme Court of Illinois, People
ex rel. Tribune Co. v. Hon. H. C. Paschen, No. 40507
(Feb. 24, 1967), by the Chicago Tribune which heralded
the event with the banner headline: "Tribune Fights
Trial Gag." Immediately the American Association
of Newspaper Publishers as well as newspapermen all
over the country lauded the efforts of the Tribune in
fighting these "gags". Chicago Tribune, Feb. 28, 1967,
at 1,2. Judge Paschen's guidelines were attacked in
both the Illinois legislature, Tribune, Feb. 22, 1967,
at 1, and in Congress, Tribune, Feb. 22, 1967, at 3, as
an unwarranted restriction on the cherished right of
freedom of speech and press. Even Judge Harold R.
Medina, whose committee saw no constitutional way
that a court could restrict publication of material not
heard in camera, voiced the opinion the Judge Paschen
was "probably overdoing it." Tribune, Feb. 27, 1967,
at 1. In the midst of this furor, the Supreme Court of
Illinois agreed to entertain the suit. Finally, before
argument, the court issued a preliminary order directing
Judge Paschen to: (1) allow the sale of transcripts; and
(2) to allow the names of sworn or excused jurymen to
be published. Tribune, March 2, 1967, at 1. Even
though the court had specifically reserved judgment
of the merits of the other restrictions (such as that on
publication of material not heard by the jury), until
a full hearing was held, the Tribune claimed victory
with the March 2nd headline: "High Court Backs
open Trials," and dismissed the suit without prejudice.
Obviously the victory, if any, for the press, is somewhat
incomplete since the real issue-whether the trial court
could control the publication of material not heard by
the jury-was never decided. In fact it seems that in
holding that the names of prospective jurors should not
be published until their selection or dismissal, the
court actually allowed restrictions on freedom of the
press. When asked to make a statement on this turn
of events, Judge Pashen appropriately notified re-
porters: "The judge said he is a litigant in a law suit
and therefore has no comment." Tribune. Marrh 2.
1967, at 1.
418 P.2d 594 (Ariz. 1966).
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per company which had published an account of
pre-trial hearings, but also voided the order of the
trial judge which prohibited the publication of
such proceedings. In so doing the court said:
The restraint imposed by the trial court in this
case strikes at the very foundation of freedom of
the press by subjecting it to censorship by the
judiciary.
CONCLUSION
Of all of the proposed solutions in the free press-
fair trial debate, the one that seems best suited
for countering the constitutional auguments of the
free press advocates while at the same time insur-
ing fair trials is the statutory scheme. It is -worthy
of mention that Mr. Justice Black, in Bridges v.
California, said:
It is to be noted at once that we have no direc-
tion by the legislature of California that pub-
licity outside the court room which comments
upon a pending case in a specified manner should
be punishable... [Sluch a declaration of the
State's policy would weigh heavily in any chal-
lenge of the law as infringing constitutional lim-
-itations.... For here the legislature of California
has not appraised a particular kind of situation
and found specific danger.85
As is pointed out by Louis L. Jaffee" and Ronald
L. Goldfarb, ' much of the emphasis of Bridges
and its progeny is on the illegitamacy of the con-
tempt power as a vehicle for the regulation of
speech and press. The chief complaints regarding
the use of contempt in this area are that too much
discretionary power is placed in the hands of one
person,' s and that the safeguards of a trial by jury
are not observed."' If a statute were adopted
proscribing the dissemination or publication of
certain material, not only would its specificity
eliminate discretionary enforcement, but the pro-
tections normally afforded an accused in criminal
litigation would be available to a violator. Thirdly,
such a statute would not constitute prior restraint
on free speech and press since the violator would
not be subject to punishment until he had breached
its provisions.' Finally, a statute would be a formu-
lation by the duly elected representatives of the
84 Id. at 596.
85 314 U.S. 252, 260 (1941).
86 Jaffe, supra note 25, at 506.
87 GOLDFARB, TE CONTE=xU POWER, 170 (1963).
3 3MEDINA REPORT, 39: "The prospect of judges...
sitting as petty tyrants handing down sentences for
contempt is not pleasant."
'9 Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 219 (1957)
(dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black).
people that a specific clear and present danger
exists--such determination would no longer be in
the hands of one man. That this last element is
important is illustrated by an excerpt from one of
the sedition cases, Gitlow v. New York:
In other words, when the legislative body has
determined generally, in the constitutional ex-
ercise of its discretion that utterances of a cer-
tain kind involve such danger of substantive evil
that they may be punished, the question whether
any specific utterance coming within the pro-
hibited class is likely, in and of itself, to bring
about the substantive evil, is not open to con-
sideration... [Such question is closed] where
the legislative body itself has previously deter-
mined the danger of substantive evil arising
from utterances of a specified character.
9'
Critics9 and advocates' of the use of the con-
tempt power over the news media, both recognize
the statutory scheme as a more desirable vehicle
for the resolution of these conflicting rights. Thus
it is suggested that the following statute be en-
acted:
1.1 It shall be unlawful for anyone, from the time
of arrest, issuance of an arrest warrant, or filing
of a complaint, until completion of trial or
final disposition without trial, to release or
disseminate the following, knowing or having
reasonable grounds to know that such will be
published in any manner other than in the of-
ficial reports of a court or legislative investiga-
tion:
a) Prior record of the accused. It shall be a
defense to any charge brought under this
under this section that, prior to arrest of a
suspect, the chief of police or his immediate
assistants had, in the interest of apprehend-
ing such suspect, authorized the release of
such information.
b) The existence or contents of any confes-
sion or statement of the accused.
c) The fact of performance or non-perform-
ance of any tests relative to the accused,
or the results therefrom.
d) The possibility of a plea of guilty by the
accused to this or any lesser charge.
e) The identity, testimony or credibility of
prospective witnesses other than the victim
or eyewitness.
90 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 670 (1925).
91 GoInnARB, supra note 87, at 302.
'3Jaffe, The Press and the Oppressed-A Study of
Prejudicial Reporting in Criminal Cases (Part 1I), 56
J. CRni. L.C. & P.S. 166 (1965).
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f) Any evidence seized before, after or at the
time of the arrest. However, it shall be
permissible for the arresting officer to re-
late the circumstances of the arrest in-
cluding the fact that accused was armed,
or resisted, or had in his possession any
"loot" of the alleged crime.
1.2 It shall be a defense to any charge brought
under this section that the dissemination of
any of the above occurred after its reception
in evidence in open court.
2.1 It shall be unlawful for any news disseminating
agency, company, or reporter to publish any
material proscribed above until the same shall
be admitted as evidence in open court.
3.1 It shall be a defense to a charge brought under
this statute that:
a) The publication of the prior record was
authorized by the appropriate police au-
thority. However, this defense shall not be
valid if the publication occurred more than
one day after the arrest of the accused.
b) The publication of evidence seized and
circumstances of the arrest was based on
the account of the arresting officer. How-
ever, this defense will not extend to any
publication made more than two days
after the arrest of the accused.
4.1 A violation of any section of this statute is
punishable by imprisonment in the county jail
for not more than six months or a fine not ex-
ceeding $10,000.00 or both.9 3
The above statute incorporates the substance
of many of the rules of court recommended by the
Reardon Committee. It seems, however, that
using them in a statutory scheme is preferable to a
rule of court in that: (a) it is on better constitu-
utional footing since it is a "direction by the legis-
lature.., that publicity outside the the court
room which comments on a pending case in a
specified manner should be punishable." According
to Mr. Justice Black in Bridges, "such a declar-
ation of the State's policy would weigh heavily in
any challenge of the law as infringing constitutional
93 The period during which dissemination and publi-
cation of prejudicial material is prohibited by the
statute, is not extended beyond the trial stage. It has
been argued that the proscriptions should remain in
effect during the appeals and, in the event of a reversal,
the new trial. It seems, however, that since the purpose
of the statute is to insulate the jury, not the judges
who have access to the proscribed material anyway,
this policy will not be effectuated by such extension.
Obviously once a new trial is ordered, the restrictions
should be reinstated.
limitations;" 14 (b) constitutional problems of
separation of powers when courts assume juris-
diction over police are avoided; (c) use of the
contempt power, which relies on judicial dis-
cretion and does not provide for the safeguards
of ordinary criminal trials, is avoided; and (d)
constitutional problems involved in holding non-
public proceedings are eliminated. It is also recom-
mended that the Medina Committee's New Canon
20 and Police Code (reprinted in The Appendix),
be adopted by the bar and law enforcement
officials respectively. Finally, these suggestions
are not intended to replace the control the court
presently has over its employees and participants
in a trial through the valid exercise of the contempt
power.
It is not anticipated that the above suggestions
will be welcomed with open arms by the news
media. In spite of the fact that that certain mem-
bers of that profession have seen fit to enact a
voluntary code of self-restraint, 95 such codes not
only are more replete with loopholes than the
present Canon 20, but are the exception and not
the rule. That it is unlikely any solution short
of absolute freedom of the press will satisfy most
newsmen is evidenced by the fact that in a North-
western University conference of lawyers and
newsmen, the latter group was unwilling to admit,
in the absence of empirical data, that there was
indeed such a thing as news coverage prejudicial
to the accused.96 Empirical data would indeed be
helpful in resolving this situation. But the re-
versal of cases where courts believe there is in-
herent prejudice to the defendant makes it obvious
that something must be done. Where there is a
conflict between two provisions of the constitu-
tion, a balancing must take place. However, the
balance must never be tipped away from the
absolute right of the defendant to a fair and im-
partial jury. The statute above and the other
regulations suggested are an attempt to protect
this right. Indeed such would not be necessary if
the Medina suggestions were followed and mean-
ingful voluntary codes were adopted by the press,
police and bar. However, the fact that the Ameri-
can Society of Newspaper Editors has recently
condemned even the liberal Medina Report,
emphasizes the fact that the press is not willing
"Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 260 (1941).
91 Voluntary Code of the Toledo Blade, printed in
MEDINA RPORT, 64-67.
96 Conference on Prejudicial News Reporting in
Criminal Cases, 186-201 (Inbau ed. 1964).
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to budge an inch, and that as judge Medina points
out:





Special Committee on Radio, T.V. and Adminis-
tration of Justice of the Bar Association of the City
of New York.
RECOMMENDED NEw CANoN 20
A. It is unprofessional for a lawyer publicly to
make, or sanction the publication or broadcast
of, an out-of-court statement or disclosure of
fact or opinion regarding a pending or anticipated
civil action or proceeding or criminal prosecution.
It is therefore the ethical responsibility of lawyers
to refrain from the public issuance of statements
or other disclosures relating to such action, pro-
ceeding, or prosecution, which concern:
1. The merits of the claims of a plantiff or
defendant in a civil action or proceeding, or
guilt or innocence of a defendant in a crim-
inal prosecution;
2. The existence or contents of a party's con-
fession, admission, or other pre-trial declar-
ation;
3. Testimony or other evidence to be offered
at trial;
4. Matters of fact bearing upon the cause, which
will not be offered in evidence at trail;
5. The credibility or reliability of witnesses, or
the probative force of other evidence offered
or to be offered at trial;
6. Testimony or other evidence which has been
excluded by the court;
7. The conduct, reputation or criminal record
of any party or witness;
8. The rulings or decisions of the court during
the litigation;
9. Any other matter which may tend to inter-
fere with a fair trial, or may otherwise tend
to prejudice the due administration of
justice.
B. It is the duty of a lawyer engaged in a civil
action or proceeding or a criminal prosecution to
attempt to restrain his client and witnesses from
97iTIME. March 10, 1967, at 97.
making any out-of-court statement or disclosure
of fact or opinion proscribed by this canon.
C. The foregoing, however, shall not be deemed
to restrict the issuance of a brief statement by a
lawyer concerning:
1. His client's intention to plead not guilty in a
pending criminal prosecution, or to defend
a pending civil action or proceeding;
2. The identity of the defendant in a pending
criminal prosecution or the fact, the time
and the place of his arrest, or the charge or
charges against him;
3. The identity of the parties to a pending civil
action or proceeding, the claim asserted and
the amount in controversy.
RECOM ENDED CODE FOR POLICE AND
LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
A. Concerning the Defendant
1. The release of information concerning the
defendant shall be limited to his name, age, occupa-
tion, marital status, and personal data not re-
lated to the crime or the character of the defendant.
His criminal record, prior medical and psychiatric
history, or military disciplinary record, if any,
shall not be released. No other information that
is clearly prejudicial to the defendant shall be
released.
2. No statement of any nature made by the
defendant, or the substance thereof, shall be
released. No reference shall be made to any test
taken by the defendant or that he has refused to
take.
3. The announcement of the arrest of the de-
fendant may include, in addition to the infor-
mation authorized in paragraph A.1, the time,
place, and manner of apprehension, as well as
the text or summary of the charge, information,
or indictment. No comments shall be made re-
lating to his guilt or innocence.
4. News media shall not be permitted to inter-
view the defendant, with or without his attorney's
consent, while he is in police custody.
5. News media shall not be permitted to photo-
graph or televise the defendant while he is in
police custody and in other than a public place.
This prohibition extends to such instances as
where he is being interrogated, where he is being
processed ("booked") following arrest, where he
is in a lockup or detention facility, or where he is
at a hospital bedside for identification purposes.
The defendant shall be escorted through public
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places as expeditiously as possible. While the
news media shall not be prevented from photo-
graphing or televising the defendant in a public
place, he shall not be halted or posed for their
convenience.
6. Where the defendant is still at large, and
it appears that he is a fugitive from justice,
additional information that may reasonably and
directly aid in effecting his apprehension, including
his photograph, may be released.
B. Concerning the Crime, the Investigation, and
the Arrest
1. A general description of the crime shall be
made available to the news media. Gruesome or
sordid aspects which tend unduly to inflame
public emotions shall not be released. Witnesses
shall not be identified by name or otherwise, nor
shall any comment be made concerning their
credibility, their testimony, or their identification
of the defendant.
2. Wherever possible, the taking of photo-
graphs of maimed or deceased victims shall not
be permitted.
3. No comment on the apparent motivation
or character of the perpetrator shall be made.
4. No information concerning scientific evi-
dence such as laboratory or ballistics tests or
fingerprints shall be released.
5. At the time of arrest, in addition to the
information which may be released concerning
the defendant, the announcement may include
the identity of the investigating and arresting
officers, and the time duration of the investi-
gation:
C. General
1. A member of the police agency shall be
designated as the Information Officer responsible
for the dissemination of all information to the
news media. It will be the responsibility of the
Information Officer to supervise the enforcement
of these regulations and to solicit and encourage
full cooperation of news media. No member of a
police agency may furnish any information to
news media without prior approval by the Infor-
mation Officer. No interviews shall be permitted
with investigating or arresting officers.
2. Wherever feasible, the Information Officer
will encourage news media to enter into pool
arrangements so as to reduce confusion and inter-
ference with .the orderly processes of law enforce-
ment. It shall be a prime responsibility of the
Information Officer to insure a calm and orderly
atmosphere during the dissemination of infor-
mation to news media.
3. The above regulations are to be adhered to
even in those instances where charges of police
inefficiency or misconduct appear in the public
press or where the published reports are misleading
or inaccurate. It shall be the obligation of the
Information Officer to refuse to elaborate on the
information previously released under this Code,
except in those circumstances where the correction
of false publication may serve to assist in the
apprehension of the defendant or will not preju-
dice his right to a fair trial. The failure on the
part of others to maintain adequate standards
will not justify avoidance by police agencies of
their responsibilities to insure the ends of justice.
B.
A Suggested Code of The Chicago
Police Department*
I. Purpose
The purpose of this order is to:
A. Continue present policy of assisting news-
papers, radio, television, and other news
media to gather news information until
a person is arrested.
B. Comply with the recent United States
Supreme Court decision in Sheppard vs.
Maxwell regarding the release to news-
papers, radio, television, and other news
media of prejudicial information regarding
persons arrested.
II. News Dissemination Regulations
A. Every effort will be made to release current
information without "partiality. Infor-
mation will not be withheld or delayed in
order to favor any particular news media
representative or agency.
B. Authorized news media representatives
are issued press cards by the Department as
provided in the Municipal Code. When
not known they will be required to identify
themselves by this means.
C. Except as provided in paragraph II-E, tele-
type messages, accident and miscellaneous
incident exception reports and field case
reports will be open for inspection in
districts and area headquarters to repre-
sentatives of the press or other news media
* Prepared during the administration of Super-
intendent 0. W. Wilson, but without any action being
taken thereon.
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